


Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/10 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/10 : CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130

25X1

**Secret**



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

CIA/OCT/IM

# Intelligence Memorandum

*Soviet Objectives at the Summit*

25X1

**Secret**

110

28 April 1972  
No. 0860/72

25X1

## WARNING

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING AND  
DECLASSIFICATION

**SECRET**

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
28 April 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Soviet Objectives at the Summit

1. The main purpose of the summit meeting, in Soviet eyes, is to lift US-Soviet relations onto a more amicable and more stable plane. This in turn is intended to promote three Soviet objectives: heading off the dangers that the USSR perceives in the Sino-US rapprochement; promoting the process of detente in Europe; and obtaining certain specific benefits in bilateral relations with the US. At the same time, the summit poses two dangers for Moscow: the chance of a failure, which would not only compromise the USSR's objectives but also discredit its leadership, and the risks of shaking established dogma and alliance relationships which are inherent in close dealings with the main imperialist rival.

2. This paper does not analyze the Soviet interest in the various bilateral negotiations scheduled to culminate at the summit. It is worth noting, however, that the Soviet leaders have a real political need for a fair measure of success in these agreements. A visible failure would increase the criticism that has been expressed by a small element of the population, would threaten to derail Soviet detente projects in Western Europe, and would make Chinese diplomacy appear as an even more formidable danger. But for the same reasons the USSR, while it wants specific bilateral agreements, cannot afford to be seen to "lose" in the negotiation of their terms.

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within CIA.

**SECRET**

25X1

SECRET

25X1

China

3. Several considerations have made a summit meeting desirable to the Soviets; China has made it virtually necessary. Moscow has been worried about the possibility of improved Sino-US relations since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969 ushered in a new phase of Chinese foreign policy. It was nevertheless taken by surprise by the rapid progression in 1971 from ping-pong diplomacy to a Presidential visit. From the Soviet standpoint, Peking is capable of any perfidy, and Moscow is also dismayed at the unpredictability it perceives in US behavior abroad. Some pride probably had to be swallowed when the Soviets chose to follow the Chinese in inviting the President, but this seemed less important to them than the need to enter the competition and to demonstrate to the US that important interests could be advanced or damaged in relations with the USSR.

4. One Soviet objective at the summit will be to probe the US about the state of its relations with China and its further intentions there. Brezhnev's keen interest showed through in his speech on 20 March, when he said of Sino-US relations that "the future, perhaps the near future, will show us how matters stand." This will be a delicate matter, in which the Soviets will not want to appear overanxious, but they will surely listen attentively to anything the President or his advisers may volunteer about what transpired in Peking. If they receive little satisfaction, they may pose direct questions. Beyond that, their concern is so great that it is not impossible that they will take occasion to warn their visitors about the dangers of closer dealings with China. They have already tried to persuade various Americans of the frustrations in store for anyone expecting reasonable behavior from Peking, citing their own experience.

-2-

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

5. In the past, the Soviets have doubtless canvassed among themselves possible agreements with the US that could be given an anti-Chinese appearance. While such devices would suit them admirably, they can have no expectation that the US, at this stage of its relations with China, would cooperate. They nevertheless expect that a generally successful summit, in and of itself, will manifest a degree of understanding between the superpowers that will offset some of the rise in Peking's prestige.

Western Europe

6. Europe will be an area of priority concern to the Soviet leaders during their talks with the President. Their most immediate and pressing objective is to secure West German ratification of the Soviet - West German treaty, and the Soviet mood in late May will be influenced in large degree by the outlook for ratification at that time. This is particularly true because of Brezhnev's close personal association with the treaty.

25X1

the Soviets can be expected to try to use the summit to influence internal debate on the treaty within West Germany. Beyond citing the meeting as a palpable sign of improved East-West relations, the USSR may make various efforts to enlist the President's help in stimulating favorable West German parliamentary action on the treaty. It may seek, for example, to elicit strong Presidential endorsement of the treaty, in the hope that this would have the desired effect in the Federal Republic.

7. One likely topic will be a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Moscow will press to obtain a clear US commitment to early actions to convene a CSCE. Moscow holds the US largely responsible for the delay in movement toward such

-3-

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

a conference, as Kosygin made clear in a remark to the Canadian ambassador on 14 April. He added that at the summit, the Soviet leaders hope to "persuade Mr. Nixon to adopt a more forthright attitude." They may offer limited concessions and clarifications on other issues--possibly a gesture with regard to starting talks on force reductions, or a specific understanding on the relationship between CSCE and force reductions--in order to obtain a definite US commitment to beginning CSCE. In making their proposals for an early start to CSCE discussions the Soviets will probably call attention to the Warsaw Pact's expressed readiness to appoint representatives to begin active preparations.

8. The Soviet leaders may well try to put off any efforts to pin them down on some of the more difficult procedural and substantive aspects of a CSCE on grounds that they are flexible. This seems to be basically true

25X1

In the sequence envisioned by Brezhnev, multilateral preparations would be followed by a conference of foreign ministers that would establish various commissions and working groups. In the final stage the CSCE would be reconvened "at the highest accepted level." The Soviets also hope that a CSCE would establish permanent bodies to continue its work. These Soviet concepts are calculated to complement French positions--part of the "special relationship" Brezhnev feels he has established with France. The Soviets, however, probably are not wedded to any particular method of conducting a conference, provided certain minimum standards are met, chiefly the inclusion of East Germany and stress on the inviolability of European boundaries.

9. The only remaining formal obstacle to beginning CSCE preparations is NATO's insistence that a Berlin agreement, interpreted to include signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol, comes first. This will present no problem to the Soviets if their

-4-

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

treaty with Bonn seems likely to be ratified. If ratification looks like a sure thing after the 4 May Bundestag vote, the Soviets may even begin to probe the US on the possibility of signing the Protocol in a ceremony which could be linked to the President's visit. They might suggest, for example, that Heath and Pompidou be invited to Moscow for this purpose at the conclusion of the summit.

10. The Soviets do not have much enthusiasm for the subject of mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR), which they view primarily as a Western precondition for other detente moves. Initially they will probably take the line that MBFR is something for "us" to settle. Only when they are persuaded that this approach is unprofitable are they likely to undertake to engage in substantive discussions of MBFR. To date, Soviet thinking on procedures for conducting talks on MBFR has been even less clear than on CSCE. Their preference appears to be for MBFR to be handled by one of the working groups to be set up by the CSCE--and therefore to be subordinate to CSCE--but their attitude on this is probably not rigid.

11. At present, MBFR is at a procedural stalemate because of Soviet unwillingness to receive Brosio, NATO's designated "explorer." In return for concessions in other areas, such as CSCE, the Soviets may offer a way out of this impasse. Since, in a sense, President Nixon will be replacing Brosio as explorer, the Soviets may make some sort of commitment that will enable MBFR to get on the track, perhaps even agreeing to receive Brosio afterward. The Soviets may make various other proposals as a way of instilling life into MBFR discussions. One such possibility is some sort of limitation on military exercises, especially in East-West border areas. Brezhnev reportedly raised this possibility at the Warsaw Pact meeting last January in Prague. Such a proposal would have the advantage of reducing tensions without actually changing force levels and without requiring complicated negotiations.

-5-

SECRET

25X1



SECRET

25X1

The Middle East

12. The Soviets do not expect that real progress toward a Middle East settlement can be achieved at the summit. They will want to keep this problem subordinate to their interests in bilateral relations, China, and Europe. They see no profit in pushing their Arab clients to make further concessions and no hope that the US can be induced to push the Israelis. While making a record of fidelity to the Arab cause, however, they may propose some way of giving new impetus to the negotiating process.

13. The USSR has been concerned that the Egyptians might conclude that only the US is capable of inducing some flexibility in the Israeli position and that Cairo must therefore turn to Washington for a settlement. The Soviets have been sensitive to US efforts to facilitate an interim settlement and proximity talks, and they are suspicious of the implications of renewed dialogue between Cairo and Washington. It is important for Moscow to have--and to be seen to have--a major role in deliberations affecting the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hence the Soviets may try to use the summit to return to bilateral discussions on the Middle East, seeking to foster the impression among the Arabs that some new diplomatic momentum has begun. They may put some scheme of this kind in the context of a proposal for regular US-Soviet consultations, which is discussed below.

14. The Soviet leaders will be prepared for a US suggestion on mutual restraint on arms shipments to the Arabs and Israelis. They will probably consider themselves in a rather good debating position on this issue in view of the decline in Soviet military deliveries to Egypt over the past several months. The current pace of arms deliveries, higher than the level prior to the June war in 1967, suggests that Moscow is not appreciably increasing Egyptian capabilities, but only maintaining them at roughly their current level.

-6-

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

15. Moscow can be expected to call attention to this and to stress the defensive nature of the weaponry provided to the Arabs. The Soviets may point out, for example, that Egypt's bomber inventory remains smaller than it was prior to the war in 1967. In fact, the Soviets have at this point delivered, broadly speaking, all the arms Egypt can absorb and more, while withholding advanced offensive weapons that might touch off a new round of major fighting. Thus the Soviets are likely to stress the common interest in holding down arms deliveries. While they will probably criticize US arms commitments to Israel, they may be generally receptive to suggestions for tacit restraint.

16. The Soviets would probably not be willing, however, to agree to any proposal for a formal, explicit, Soviet-US agreement on curbing arms deliveries to the Middle East. Moscow would expect a vitriolic Arab reaction to such an arrangement as long as Israel is occupying Arab territory. The USSR would be afraid that such a move could endanger the advances that it has made in the area over the past several years--gains made largely by virtue of its role as arms supplier. It will therefore not want to go beyond, at most, a general understanding that would stop well short of verifiable commitments.

#### Vietnam

17. Brezhnev and his colleagues got involved in Vietnam in early 1965. They originally increased Soviet support for the North Vietnamese in an effort to place themselves in a better position to compete with China for the allegiance of foreign Communists and other "progressives," and to refute Chinese charges that Moscow had sold out to "imperialism." Since last summer, however, Peking's own overtures toward the US have dissipated the sting of Chinese charges of "Soviet-US collusion," and it is now less important for the Soviets to be able to disprove Chinese allegations. Thus Moscow's

-7-

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

priorities are no longer what they were when it became involved in Vietnam seven years ago, although the Soviets' basic commitment to Hanoi remains in force and cannot be easily abandoned.

18. This new situation affects how the Soviets look at Vietnam, but it may not have much early impact on what they feel they can do about the situation there. In weighing the options open to them, the Soviet leaders probably have already concluded that even if they took the extreme measure of stopping military aid to Hanoi, the Chinese would probably increase their assistance and the North Vietnamese would be able to carry on much as before. Moreover, curtailment of Soviet aid to North Vietnam, or any form of public break with Hanoi, would expose the USSR to charges of Soviet perfidy and cowardice which, though less painful than they might have been at an earlier stage, would still be highly damaging, both at home and abroad. Equally important, the Soviets would fear that the US, viewing such concessions as a major sign of weakness, would press its advantage in other areas.

19. In discussing their arms aid to North Vietnam, the Soviets will probably attempt to contrast what they have given Hanoi with what Saigon has received from the US. They are likely to argue that what they have provided is primarily "defensive" in character and to stress that Moscow has denied Hanoi certain kinds of sophisticated weaponry that have been made available to other Soviet clients. The Soviet leaders will almost certainly refuse to undertake any explicit commitment to curb their arms aid to Hanoi. They may be willing to hold out some hope, however, that if the present offensive ends indecisively they will thereafter commend the resumption of negotiations to their ally and hint that their military support is not limitless.

A Continuing Formal Relationship with the US?

20. The present Soviet leadership has a propensity for formalizing its relationships with other

25X1

SECRET

**SECRET**

25X1

powers in international documents. In the recent past it has signed treaties with states it supports-- Egypt, India, and Iraq. It has also negotiated protocols on regular bilateral consultations with Western states with which it is not unfriendly-- France and Canada. The USSR evidently regards these protocols as useful in providing continuing access to other governments, in laying some inhibitions on the other partner should it contemplate anti-Soviet actions, and in signifying a shift in Cold War alignments.

21. The USSR would see advantages in achieving such a relationship with the US. For one thing, it would permit them to tell their Arab clients that they were dealing actively with the US on the Middle East problem. With respect to bilateral relations themselves, the Soviets probably judge that regular consultations would help to keep US-Soviet relations in reasonably good repair. Moscow would also like to have open channels for discussing such issues of common concern to the superpowers as nuclear non-proliferation and crisis management. The Soviets would expect this arrangement to impress the Chinese with the limits of their own potentialities. It would also further the sense of detente in Europe, while simultaneously causing US allies to worry about American reliability. Last June, a senior Soviet diplomat in Paris solicited the reaction of a US diplomat to the suggestion that Moscow and Washington conclude such a protocol. If the Soviets find the US reluctant, they might fall back to a proposal that the joint communiqué endorse the principle of regular consultations at a reasonably high level.

25X1

**SECRET**